Somali pirates just released a British couple that had been held for more than a year. Whether the pirates paid, and how much, is a bit of a mystery, but it's a telling account of how piracy is different now compared to the so-called "Golden Age" of the 17th and 18th centuries. Piracy is now about ransom, both for objects as well as people.
As an AOL news report (14 Nov 2010) points out:
"They could not make it through the dangerous waters of East Africa, where pirate attacks have spiked the last several years. Despite an international flotilla of warships and aircraft, pirates continue to prowl the Indian Ocean seemingly at will, pouncing on pleasure craft, fishing vessels and huge cargo ships using small skiffs, automatic weapons and rocket-propelled grenades.
"Somali pirates still hold close to 500 hostages and more than 20 vessels. The pirates typically only release hostages for multimillion-dollar ransoms. But unlike the companies who own large transport ships, the Chandlers are far from rich. Paul Chandler has been identified in the British media as a retired construction site manager, while Rachel has been described as an economist.
"Pirates had initially sought a $7 million ransom. The Chandler family said in a statement Sunday that during protracted discussions with pirates that it was "a difficult task" to convey that Paul and Rachel were "two retired people on a sailing trip on a small private yacht and not part of a major commercial enterprise."
Somali pirates see pirating as a business enterprise. That's not particularly surprising, and it's a timeless justification for pirating. The difference, I think, is that now largely the sole purpose of pirating is to generate revenue through ransom. For large shipping companies, paying off pirates might be cheaper than launching large-scale security details, or paying national navies to to hunt them down. This has made pirating pretty lucrative, generating hundreds of millions of dollars of revenue in countries (e.g. Somalia) that are dirt poor with disfunctional governments (and weak or nonexistent property rights to go with it).
The problem is that this brand of pirating sees humans as simply another asset, an object, to be auctioned off. If you're rich, you can go home. If you're poor...just say you're lucky to survive (as the Chandlers were). Again, from the AOL News report
"The fact that Paul and Rachel Chandler couldn't pay a big ransom helped stretch out their ordeal 388 agonizing days - until Sunday, when they were released thin and exhausted, but smiling. It was one of the longest and most dramatic hostage situations since the Somali piracy boom began several years ago."
Historically, while life was cheap on the high seas, the gemera; goal generally was not to capture people and ransom them off. People were killed largely because they resisted pirates who were after things they valued--cargo, gold, jewels, currency, etc.
Relegating human life to the value of objects that can be ransomed takes today's pirating up several levels in evil; this isn't burglary on the high seas. It's in the same class as slavery and human trafficking. The fight now is about the value of human life, not protecting our physical property.
For the first time in this pirate-infested region of northern Somalia, some of the very communities that had been flourishing with pirate dollars — supplying these well-known criminals with sanctuary, support, brides, respect and even government help — are now trying to push them out.
Grass-roots, antipirate militias are forming. Sheiks and government leaders are embarking on a campaign to excommunicate the pirates, telling them to get out of town and preaching at mosques for women not to marry these un-Islamic, thieving “burcad badeed,” which in Somali translates as sea bandit. There is even a new sign at a parking lot in Garoowe, the sun-blasted capital of the semiautonomous region of Puntland, that may be the only one of its kind in the world. The thick red letters say: No pirates allowed.
Much like the violence, hunger and warlordism that has engulfed Somalia, piracy is a direct — and some Somalis say inevitable — outgrowth of a society that has languished for 18 years without a functioning central government and whose economy has been smashed by war.
But here in Garoowe, the pirates are increasingly viewed as stains on the devoutly Muslim, nomadic culture, blamed for introducing big-city evils like drugs, alcohol, street brawling and AIDS. A few weeks ago, Puntland police officers broke up a bootlegging ring and poured out 327 bottles of Ethiopian-made gin. In Somalia, alcohol is shunned. Such a voluminous stash of booze is virtually unheard of.
More interesting, perhaps, is the increasing willingness of pirates to give up the trade. This risks of the pirate life have become significant enough that some pirates are willing to go legitimate for lower pay, despite the promise of fortunes.Still, the Puntland pirate bosses insist they are ready to call it quits, if the sheiks find jobs for their young underlings and help the pirates form a coast guard to protect Somalia’s 1,880-mile coastline from illegal fishing and dumping. These are longstanding complaints made by many Somalis, including those who don’t scamper up the sides of cargo ships, AK-47 in hand.
It is a stretch, to say the least, that the world would accept being policed by rehabilitated hijackers. But on Monday, Mr. Boyah and two dozen other infamous Puntland pirates, many driving Toyota Surfs, a light, fast sport utility vehicle that has become the pirate ride of choice, arrived at an elder’s house in Garoowe to make their case nonetheless.
These kinds of choices aren't unique to Somali pirates. Many pirates in the 17th and 18th century yearned for the ability to settle down to a liesurely life without the imminent threat of the gallows or death at sea. Few accomplished that goal, but the sway of a steady income without risk is a strong one. Perhaps the pirates in Somalia will have a better shot at accomplishing this than their predecessors.But the trademark nine-metre pirate "mother-ship" escorting two small skiffs had been spotted long before by its intended prey, a French warship bristling with cannons, radar and well-trained servicemen.
The frigate Nivose, one of the ships regularly patrolling the region as part of the European Union anti-piracy mission called Atalanta, made every effort to keep the pirates thinking it was a merchant vessel.
The lieutenant commander of the Nivose, Jean-Marc Le Quilliec, dashed out of his cabin, certain the pirates spotted by a Spanish vessel the previous day were at his mercy.
At about 3pm Sydney time, the French vessel moved into the sun to keep its cover. "They're speeding right towards us," Commander Le Quilliec marvelled.
"Let's just head into the sun - and then we'll turn around to hit them head on."
When the unsuspecting pirates were close enough, the Nivose unleashed commandos on outboards and dispatched a helicopter to intercept the pirates, leaving them no chance.
"It's the exact same location as the case of the Safmarine Asia," Commander Le Quilliec said, referring to an interception his ship carried out on April 15 during an attack on a Liberia-flagged merchant vessel.
This time, the helicopter fired two warning shots to stop one of the two skiffs from fleeing. There was only one pirate left on the mother ship, which was also intercepted moments later, with nothing on board except fuel and sacks of potatoes.
The news this week that private security guards drove off pirates after a nighttime attack on an Italian Ocean liner has a number of implications. It looks like private ship owners have finally seen the costs of pirating escalate to the point they have to arm themselves and take action. But, will this simply ratchet up the number of incidents and the violence of the attacks?
The fact it the defense took place on an ocean liner, carrying 1,500 passengers and crew, is particularly notable. While the Somali pirates are more interested in holding one or two human hostages for ransom, the uncertainty and terror from these attacks threatens the health of the industry. Why would anyone go on a cruise if they are believe they are increasingly likely to be attacked?\
Also, given the logistical nightmare involved with trying to track down pirates off the Somali Coast, we should expect to see an increase in private security as a relatively cheap alternative to sending flotillas of warships from dozens of countries out to track the illusive pirates.
From the Associated Press (April 26, 2009)
Saturday's exchange of fire was one of the first reported between pirates and a nonmilitary ship. International military forces have battled pirates, with US navy snipers killing three holding an American captain hostage in one of the highest-profile incidents.
Saturday's attack occurred about 200 miles (325 kilometers) north of the Seychelles, and about 500 miles (800 kilometers) east of Somalia, according to the anti-piracy flotilla headquarters of the Maritime Security Center Horn of Africa.
Pinto said the pirates fired with automatic weapons, slightly damaging the liner, and tried to put a ladder on board. But he said they were unable to climb aboard.
The commander said his security forces opened fire with pistols and the ANSA news agency said the pistols had been kept in a safe under the joint control of the commander and security chief.
Cruise line security work is a popular job for young Israelis who have recently been discharged from mandatory army service, as it is a good chance to save money and travel.
Of additional interest is the Somali pirates attacked at night with assualt rifles, but were repelled with pistols. What will happen if the pirates become even more aggressive and brazen?
Economist Peter Leeson has written an excellent new book on the economics of pirates and pirate governance: The Invisible Hook: The Hidden Economics of Pirates (Princeton University Press). The book is a must read for anyone interested in the history of pirates.
Leeson wades through original source material as well as pirate histories to draw surprising insights into the pirate life, using economic analysis to explain their tactics as well as the reasoning behind the peculiar structure of pirate articles and codes. Many with deep knowledge of pirates won't find a lot truly new in the book. Rather, it's the way Lesson connects the dots that makes this book stand out. Indeed, with citations to our own Federalist papers, Leeson does an excellent job of showing how the choices pirate communities made about their captains and on-board ship behavior foreshadowed many of the basic principles that underly the U.S. version of Constitutional government and its unique system of checks and balances on power. He also provides an excellent and crisp analysis of the calculated use of terror by pirates to achieve their objectives.
The book is eminently readable compared to most books by economists. No need to worry about math, supply and demand curves, or jargon. Leeson also keeps the pace of the book flowing through solid organization and an admirable ability to avoid straying off theme or subject. But, be forewarned. The Invisible Hook is targeted toward adults. The author is thorough and takes his subject seriously.
Professors and teachers: This would be an excellent supplemental text for courses on political economy, public choice economics, public policy, economic history, or criminal justice.